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the principal case was not willing to construe the mere unauthorized
taking as an act of dominion sufficient to complete a conversion.
After taking the truck to its garage, the seller, by the application of
labor and materials, attempted to repair it. This act of repairing was
apparently not intended as a gift to the owner. It was done wholly with-
out the owner's sanction or request, and seems difficult to justify on any
other basis than the seller's claim to some interest in the truck. Any
interest so claimed would necessarily be inconsistent with the owner's
undivided interest. This is more than a mere moving of the chattels of
another for the benefit of the owner. Whitaker v. Clark, supra. It
indicates some claim inconsistent with the owner's right, and may strictly
be called an act of dominion. The conversion seems clear at this point.
Gillespie v. Holland, 3 Ohio App. I16, 20 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 17, 26
Ohio C.D. 220 (1914); Great imerican Mutual Indemnity Co. v.
Meyer, IS Ohio App. 97 (1924); Miller v. Uhl, 37 Ohio App. 276,
174 N.E. 591, 33 Ohio Law Rep. 294 (1924).
The final act of retaking from the owner's premises is said, by the
court, to complete the cause of action. Even after the repairing of the
truck had supplied the element of dominion, essential to the act of con-
version, the owner could elect to waive the tort and accept the return
of the chattel, or to treat the acts as conversion and sue for the value of
the chattel converted. Sammis v. Sly, supra; BIGELOW, TORTs, p. 404-
The retaking was with the expressed permission of the owner, and such
a taking (of itself) could not be a conversion. A taking, to be a con-
version, must be wholly without the owner's assent, expressed or implied.
Mann v. Lamb, 83 Minn. 14, 85 N.W. 827 (I9OX). The refusal of
the owner to accept the return of the chattel indicated his election to
treat the acts of the seller as constituting a conversion. The retaking
made the cause of action complete.
ROBERT M. ANDERSON
DOGS - LIABILITY FOR INJURY BY
The plaintiff had a portion of his thumb bitten off in endeavoring to
separate two fighting dogs. The defendant had stepped out of a store
when the dog owned by the son of the plaintiff attacked the defendant's
dog which was in harness. The defendant attempted to pull her dog
back and the plaintiff took hold of the collar of his son's dog in an effort
to part them. It was at this time that a portion of the plaintiff's thumb
was bitten off, and there was no question but that it was the defendant's
dog which did the biting. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirming the
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judgment of the Municipal Court of Cleveland, held that absolute
liability is imposed upon the owner of a dog for the injury inflicted under
Ohio G.C. sec. 5838, which reads in part: "A dog that chases, worries,
injures, or kills sheep . . . or person, can be killed at any time or place;
. . .The owner or harborer of such dog shall be liable to a person
damaged for the injury done." Dragonette v. Brandes et al., 135 Ohio
St. 223, 14 Ohio 0. 6i (1939).
Where the action is brought under the common law, a majority of
the cases impose absolute liability on the owner of the dog if scienter is
proved, i.e., that the owner had notice of the dog's vicious propensities.
Hicks v. Sullivan, 122 Cal. App. 635, io Pac. (2d) 516 (1932);
Moore v. McKay, 55 S.W. (2d) 865 (Texas, 1932); Brewer v.
Furtwangler, 171 Wash. 617, 18 Pac. (2d) 837 (i933). Another
group of cases in effect impose absolute liability when scienter is proved,
but say that the gist of the action is the negligence which is presumed
from the defendant having notice of the dog's vicious propensities. Earl
v. Van Alstine, 8 Barb. 630 (N. Y., I85o); Roettinger, Admr. v.
Greser et ad., 12 Ohio L. Abs. 157, 181 N.E. 926 (I93i). This pre-
sumption of negligence can not be removed by proof of care on the part
of the defendant in keeping the dog. Muller v. McKesson et al., 73
N. Y. 195 (878).
The leading Ohio case under the common law is Hayes v. Smith,
62 Ohio St. i6l, 56 N.E. 879, 43 W.L.B. 265, i5 Ohio C.C. 300,
8 Ohio C.D. 92 (i9oo), in which the Ohio Supreme Court said that
in addition to scienter, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was
negligent in the manner in which he restrained the dogs. In making
the gist of the action the negligent manner in which the dogs are kept,
it appears that the Court has misinterpreted the common law theory as
represented by Earl v. Van 4lstine, supra, where there is a conclusive
presumption of negligence in the very fact that the dogs are kept after
notice of their vicious propensities. Therefore, the Hayes case differs
from the majority of the common law cases by saying that knowledge
of the vicious nature of the dog does not attach absolute liability to the
owner in the absence of negligence in the actual keeping of the dog. This
departure from the prevailing common law doctrine was pointed out in
Thomas v. Boyson, 63 Ohio St. 576, 21 Ohio C.C. 302, ii Ohio C.D.
773, 6o N.E. 1134, 44 W.L.B. 223 (i9oi), although in arriving at
the decision, the Court followed the doctrine of Hayes v. Smith. How-
ever, a more recent Ohio case followed the common law theory of the
Van Alstine case when the Court held that knowledge of the dog being
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vicious gives rise to a presumption of negligence and the owner keeps the
dog at his own peril. Roettinger, Admr. v. Greser et al., supra.
In 1854, the Ohio General Assembly passed a statute which imposed
absolute liability on the owners or harborers of dogs for injuries inflicted
on sheep. Swan's Statutes of 1854, 328. In Job v. Harlan, 13 Ohio St.
485 (1862), it was held that this statute dispensed with the necessity of
proving scienter. In an action brought under a statute passed in 186o,
which extended the absolute liability to include injuries to persons, S. &
C. St. 71, the Court declared that the statute abrogated the common
law requirement of scienter. Gries v. ZeCk, 24 Ohio St. 329 (1873).
At the time of the decision in Hayes v. Smith the statute in effect did not
extend liability to protect persons, and it was probably with this decision
in mind that the Legislature one month later passed Ohio G.C. sec.
4212-2, 94 Ohio Laws 118 (19oo), which was similar in nature to the
present Code section 5838 by which it was repealed. Sec. 5838 has
abolished negligence in the restraining of the dogs as a test of liability,
Klcybolte v. Buffon, 89 Ohio St. 6i, 1O5 N.E. 192, 58 W.L.B. 449;
ii Ohio Law Rep. 316, 14 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 511, 23 Ohio C.D. 211
(913); Lisk, ddmr. v. Hora, io9 Ohio St. 519, 143 N.E. 545
(924), as well as the test of scienter. Hayes v. Guard et al., 9 Ohio
App. 377 (i918); Mehmert v. Kelso, 6 Ohio App. 69, 26 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 350, 28 Ohio C.D. 515, 6i W.L.B. 299 (1915)-
In Ohio action may be brought either under the statute or at the
common law. Roettinger, Zdmr. v. Greser, supra; Lisk, Admr. v.
Hora, supra. In order to establish his case in an action brought under
the statute, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant was the
owner or the harborer of the dog and that the injury was inflicted by the
dog. Sawrey v. Grant, 31 Ohio App. 14, i65 N.E. 97, 7 Ohio L. Abs.
6o (1928); Kingsley v. Yocom, 34 Ohio App. 226, 17o N.E. i8o, 31
Ohio Law Rep. 216, 8 Ohio L. Abs. i 16 (1929); Bevin v. Griffiths,
44 Ohio App. 94, 184 N.E. 401, 37 Ohio Law Rep. 531, 13 Ohio L.
Abs. 2 84 (1932). In the latter case, a large German Police dog owned
by the defendant threw himself against the plaintiff, a servant in the
defendant's home, and caused her to fall whereby she sustained the
injuries for which the action was brought. The plaintiff was required
only to show that the defendant owned or harbored the dog and that the
dog injured her person. In Kingsley v. Yocom, a trespasser was allowed
to recover for the injury sustained even though the defendant had placed
warning signs about the premises and the dog was tied. Under the
statute, contributory negligence is held to be no defense because the
negligence of the defendant is immaterial. Siegfried et al. v. Everhart,
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55 Ohio App. 351, 9 N.E. (2d) 891, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 361, 9 Ohio
0. 85 (1936). This case involved a set of facts similar to the case at
bar, the plaintiff having been bitten while attempting to separate two
dogs. The Court held that contributory negligence was no defense since
the liability was predicated upon the statute and not upon the negligence
of the defendant.
The phrase often used in dealing with cases of this nature that "every
dog is entitled to one bite" certainly needs to be qualified in Ohio. The
prevailing common law theory would say that he is entitled to one bite;
the Hayes case, that he is entitled to more than one bite; but under
section 5838 of the General Code, the unfortunate canine is entitled to
no bites at all. DAvm A. WIBLE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION- AVAILABILITY OF COMMON
LAW REMEDIES FOR NON-COMPENSABLE OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES
Smith brought an action in the Common Pleas Court of Marion
County for damages for silicosis caused by the negligence of his employer,
the Marion Brass & Bronze Foundry. In Cuyahoga County, on similar
facts, the administratrix of the estate of one Triff, a deceased employee,
filed an action for wrongful death against the National Bronze &
Aluminum Foundry Co. Demurrers were sustained to each petition,
which rulings were affirmed by the Courts of Appeal for the Third and
Eighth Districts respectively. Motions to certify were allowed by the
Supreme Court, which considered both cases in a single opinion. It was
held that the common law remedy of an employee against his employer
for occupational diseases, not compensable under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, has not been taken away by the organic or statutory law
of Ohio. Triff v. National Bronze & .lluminum Foundry Co., Smith
v. Lau, 135 Ohio St. 191, 2o N.E. (2d) 232, 14 Ohio 0. 48 (1939).
Thus, by a four to three decision, the court has directly reversed
its former position, as set forth in Zaiachuck v. Willard Storage Battery
Co., lO6 Ohio St. 538, 14o N.E. 405 (I919), and Mabley and Carew
v. Lee, 129 Ohio St. 69, 193 N.E. 745, IOO A.L.R. 511 (1934)-
This may be attributed to the shifting personnel of the court, rather
than to the inconstant attitude of any of the individual members. None
of the majority group was on the court at the time of the Zaiachuck
case, and only Judge Zimmerman sat in the Mabley and Carew case,
